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TAX FORUM
DORIS L. BOSWORTH, CPA

Recent Decisions and Rulings Affecting
Income, Estate and Gift Tax Planning
During the past year as the result of Revenue
Rulings and case law, many tax concepts within
the trust, estate and gift tax area have under
gone change. An examination of some of these
changes to determine what effect they may
have on future tax planning would seem to be
in order.
One controversial ruling emanating from the
Treasury Department is concerned with a
rather tenuous application of the constructive
receipt doctrine. The facts responsible for the
ruling would apply in many similar situations
inasmuch as it is common practice for executors
or trustees to waive commissions due to a per
sonal relationship with the beneficiary of an
estate or trust. In Revenue Ruling 64-225 four
trustees had been taking commissions annually
on income, but never on principal. Finally, they
petitioned the Court for principal commissions;
but, just prior to the entry of a decree, two of
the trustees waived their rights to take. The
Commissioner ruled that not only were these
waived commissions taxable income to the trus
tees, but were a gift over to the trust and sub
ject to gift tax. The theory advanced in sub
stantiation of this position was that throughout
the period prior to waiver the trustees re
tained the power to take commissions and
rendered an accounting to the Surrogate’s Court
upon which such commissions would be based.
These acts were interpreted as negating any
intent to render services gratuitously. The in
come was always available, and renunciation at
a later time did not alter the constructive re
ceipt.
Carrying this theory to its extreme, if an
individual were to render a service on the
basis of friendship, any refusal of money offered
by the friend in return would create taxable in
come. Obviously in the future, upon the cre
ation of an estate or trust, the overall tax cost
of waiving commissions should be computed. If
any tax benefits are to be derived from such a
waiver, the waiver should be effected immedi
ately prior to the rendition of services.
Two interesting cases decided in 1965 in
volved gifts of future interests within the pur
view of Section 2503 (c) of the Internal Rev
enue Code. Under that section gifts to minors
are not considered gifts of future interests if
they may be expended by, or for the benefit
of, a minor. In J. Duncan, D.C. Fla., 6/18/65 a
trust was established for a minor, the corpus of
which consisted of an insurance policy on the
minor’s life, cash and securities. The trust
agreement gave sole discretionary powers to

the trustee, subject, however, to a directive that
all available funds were to be used first for the
payment of insurance .premiums. The Florida
District Court held this to be a gift of a future
interest in view of the restrictions imposed upon
the trustee by the directive.
At the same time in Nell K. Ross et al., C.A.
5, 7/2/65 a contrary decision was reached in
a fact situation involving more severe limita
tions of the trustee’s powers. Under local law
corpus could be expended for the maintenance
and education of a minor only in the event the
parents were unable to provide adequate sup
port, and then only upon C(5urt order, except
in an emergency. The Court held that restric
tions imposed by local law in the case of minors
were common to all states. It reasoned that a
gift of a present interest to a minor would be
virtually impossible if uniform statutory restric
tions applied under Section 2503 (c). In view
of these two decisions it would seem that
other than in the case of local statutory restric
tions, care should be taken to guard against
the creation of trusts which, by their terms,
contain any limitations repugnant to the discre
tionary powers of a trustee.
In instances where the duration of a trust
exceeds a period of ten years, income will be
taxed either to the beneficiary or to the trust,
with corpus reverting to the grantor upon termi
nation. The net tax-saving feature in diverting
income from higher to lower tax brackets, with
out absolute relinquishment of the corpus, nat
urally makes such a trust attractive. The pen
alties for failure to comply with statutory
requirements in establishing a ten-year tempo
rary trust have recently been graphically illus
trated in C. O. Bibby, 44 T.C. No. 59. In this
case the trust agreement which was to remain
in force for a period of ten years and one day
after the date of the execution of the instru
ment was duly signed by the grantors. Transfer
of trust property was not effected until almost
a year later when the property was conveyed
by deed. Under local law conveyance took
place at the time the deed was drawn. The Tax
Court ruled that this trust did not qualify under
the “more than ten year” rule as the trust was
executed when the grantors signed the instru
ment, but the corpus would revert to the grant
ors in less than ten years. As a safeguard in
utilization of the ten-year trust, it is evident
that rather than to rely on local law which may
be subject to varying interpretations, execution
of the trust instrument should always be post
poned until there has been legal conveyance of
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the corpus to the trust. In the alternative, the
term of the trust should run in excess of the
minimal period of ten years and one day.
Attention has been focused on the necessity
of careful estate planning where a Subchapter
S corporation forms part of the corpus of an
estate. Very often there will be a conflict of
interests arising between a desire to obtain
optimum tax benefits for the estate and the
maintenance of Subchapter S status. In Old
Virginia Brick Co., Inc., 44 T.C. No. 69 that is
exactly what happened. Upon the death of a
stockholder of a Subchapter S corporation his
estate continued to hold the stock which, in
accordance with the terms of the will, should
have been turned over to a trust for his widow.
Since a trust cannot be a shareholder of a Sub
chapter S corporation, the election would be
automatically terminated. The corporation at
tempted to impute stock ownership to the
widow rather than the trust, but the Tax Court
rejected this contention on the grounds that
even if this were valid, the widow had not made
a timely election. There is a common tendency
to prolong the administration of an estate to
derive tax benefit from income being taxed to
that entity, rather than flowing through to bene
ficiaries who are already in a high tax bracket.
Where a Subchapter S corporation comprises
one of the assets of the estate, however, there
is the ever-present danger that the Treasury
Department will challenge the period of admin
istration, impute ownership to a beneficiary
who has failed to make a timely election, and
thus terminate the tax status of the corporation.
In valuing property contributed to a charit
able foundation, there has been an important
reversal of the position of the Tax Court involv
ing completely similar situations. In a prior case
a hospital received property from a taxpayer
which was appraised by them at $5,550 but
only $460 was realized when it was auc
tioned off to raise funds for the hospital. This
last figure was the limit placed by the Treasury
Department on the amount of the contribution
by the taxpayer. In Daniel S. McGuire, 44 T.C.
No. 75 property received by that same hospital
and appraised at a value of $20,125 brought
only $3,015 at auction. The Court allowed
contributions of $5,000 on the grounds that
the intrinsic value of the property was in
excess of the auction price which only reflected
the amount to be realized in a quick sale. The
valuation would have probably been different
if the owner of the property had utilized the
auction method of disposing of the property
himself. Where, however, the property would
have brought a higher price had it been dis
posed of in an orderly fashion to interested
buyers but was “given away” through the
method of disposition employed by the hospital,
the Court recognized the fallacy of using this
price as a proper value.

Fundamental Differences
(continued from page 4)
be followed in record keeping. There seems to
have been a general distrust of businessmen on
the part of the central governments, or else why
do most countries require bound ledger books
with pre-numbered pages, allow entries to be
made only in ink (in Germany to this day the
use of ballpoint pens in accounting records is
prohibited), and forbid all erasures? These legal
restrictions raise the question whether Eu
ropean computers will have built-in governors
which flash red lights and set off alarms every
time somebody tries to erase a prior entry.
The detailed legal requirements for account
ing systems and practices should have made
it easy to compare the financial statements of
different companies in one country since the
form and wording are usually prescribed by
law and would therefore be identical. How
ever, comparability is generally impaired by
transfers to and from legal, free, and contin
gency reserves and by increases or decreases in
asset valuation reserves, all of which appear on
the income statement. There also seem to be
ways of dressing up or down the income state
ment, or how else can one explain the nice
round profit figures some companies show? The
Farbenfabriken Bayer, for instance, one of the
largest German corporations, lists total income
for 1964 of DM 2,229,963,553.39 and total ex
penses of DM 1,952,138,553.39, leaving a
round profit for the year of DM 277,825,000.00.
The fact that continental Europe did not
pass through a phase of intensive and extensive
commercial activity is probably the reason risk
taking is unpopular on the Continent and con
servatism is exalted beyond reasonable limits.
The legal reserves already mentioned are an in
dication of this conservatism, but besides these
legal reserves, many European companies also
have hidden and free reserves.
Hidden reserves arise most frequently from
the revaluation of assets. In Denmark manufac
turing overhead is not included in the ending
inventory of manufactured goods or in the basis
of fixed assets constructed for company use;
in Germany each individual stock or bond cer
tificate held as an investment must be valued
at cost or market, whichever is lower; in Italy
inventories are often valued at an ultraconserva
tive market value; and in Sweden inventories
can be written down by as much as sixty per
cent of the average inventory for the preceding
two years, sometimes resulting in a credit bal
ance which is then shown among the liabilities!
The existence of these hidden reserves is wellknown and often mentioned in the companies
act of a country. In Switzerland, for instance,
the secret reserves must be brought to the au
ditor’s attention but cannot be disclosed in the
annual report without the board’s consent; and
(continued to page 10)
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